The modern doctor's dilemma: rationing and ethics in healthcare John Butler PhD DLitt SECTION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & PUBLIC HEALTH, 11 MARCH 1999 From one point of view, to talk about rationing and ethics is to engage in subversion, for in the eyes of the UK government there is no such thing as rationing in healthcare. The Prime Minister has committed his government to providing healthcare of a nationally attested standard wherever and whenever it is needed, and ministers have held unswervingly to the line that rationing is neither necessary nor practised in the National Health Service1. They insist that the NHS is still committed to providing and is still providing-a comprehensive range of services from the cradle to the grave. Rationing from this very particular standpoint would mean the total removal of certain services from the menu of availability through the NHS, and this, ministers claim, is simply not happening.
There are two difficulties with this line. One is that, even within this rather strict definition of rationing, the claim is seemingly not true2'3. Various treatments are being dropped from the NHS menu in many districts, from dentistry to in-vitro fertilization, from cosmetic surgery to varicose veins, and from reversal of sterilization to aesthetic orthodontics. A second difficulty with the official line is that it reflects an extreme view of the nature of rationing. To define rationing as the out-and-out non-availability of services is to ignore the various other guises under which it may appear4. There is rationing by delay, which is the classic form in the NHS. There is rationing by denial, where clinicians persuade themselves and their patients that a particular treatment is not indicated. There is rationing by dilution, where services are not actually denied but are spread thinly among competing patients, some of whom receive a less than optimal standard of care. And there is rationing by price, where a financial barrier is erected between the service and the patient, and those who cannot afford to surmount it are deterred from using it.
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: A SHAVIAN

VIGNETTE
The gap between supply and demand is now so pervasive in all healthcare systems that a large measure of agreement exists about the inevitability of rationing in one guise or another. It is at this point that questions of an ethical kind begin to loom, particularly in the NHS; for what is at stake is the distribution of public resources. The classic form in which such questions are cast is that of choosing between patients (often, to heighten the dramatic tension, between dying patients) who are competing for a limited treatment resource. 'Imagine', say the textbooks on medical ethics, 'that there are three patients with end-stage renal failure and only one available place on a dialysis machine. . .'. And the framework within which this kind of question is set is the Aristotelian notion of distributional justice5. Such justice, Aristotle proclaimed, requires equals to be treated equally and unequals unequally. It is not simply a matter of treating everyone equally or in the same way; rather, it is about sharing out the burdens and benefits of society in proportion to the morally relevant differences between them. It would, for example, be perfectly just to give patient A more or better treatment than patients B or C provided A differed from B and C in ways that were generally held to be morally relevant.
It is here, of course, that the serious debating begins, for the question must then be confronted: what are the morally relevant differences between people that would justify their unequal treatment? It was this question that George Bernard Shaw exploited so brilliantly in The Doctor's Dilemma6. Shaw presents us with two men, Louis Dubedat and Dr Blenkinsop, both of whom are dying from tuberculosis and each of whom is clamouring for the miracle cure discovered by the distinguished physician, Sir Colenso Ridgeon. The dilemma lies in the fact that Ridgeon has the capacity in his clinic to take only one extra patient. How is he to choose between them? What might be the morally relevant characteristics that that would justify his choosing Dubedat rather than Blenkinsop or Blenkinsop rather than Dubedat?
In typical Shavian fashion, the two men are presented in a way that heightens the agony of the choice. Dubedat is a young and brilliant artist with a unique gift to bring joy and beauty into people's lives. He is handsome and engaging. But he is also an unrepentant bigamist, fraudster and petty thief. Dr Blenkinsop, by contrast, is a late-middle-aged general practitioner, flabby and shabby, whose exit from the world would pass entirely unremarked. Being too poor to policy that discriminated against patients because of their self-induced risk factors9. On the other side of the debate is the thrust of public opinion, expressed through citizens' juries, that those who fail to take good care of their health may rightly be asked to pay the price in their hour of need10.
A third characteristic is social or economic merit. All else being equal, would it be morally acceptable to choose patients who are socially and economically valued by society in preference to those who are unemployed or who are seen for other reasons as a drain on society's resources? On one side of the debate are those who hold firmly to the Judaeo-Christian belief that each life is equally precious in the eyes of God and who would therefore find it morally abhorrent to prefer, say, a professor of surgery over a homeless schizophrenic if all else between them is equal11. On the other side are those who argue that this is quite simply unrealistic: society has a right to invest in its own future, and if the social and economic returns from treating the professor are judged to be greater than those from treating the schizophrenic, then society can justly offer him preferential treatment in situations where choice is inevitable.
This kind of moral debate will run and run. We each hold our own personal views and we each have our distinctive opportunities for expressing them. The discourse should, however, be based on as wide and as systematic an ethical framework as possible. It is quite easy to articulate the course of action that we individually judge to be morally right in any situation of choice: it is rather more difficult to explain why we think it is right. If, for example, we hold the view that age is not a morally relevant quality, then we need to locate our view within a systematic framework of moral values about age and personhood. Yet this is far from easy, for it requires us to articulate the origins of our moral sentiments and to explain and justify how they relate to a wider skein of values about justice and fairness.
STORIES FROM THE COAL-FACE
The argument now switches to a different track, for although the moral dilemmas of choosing between patients (or categories of patients) are real enough, there are other and possibly more pressing problems of rationing in healthcare that engage the moral energies of those who work at the coal-face of health and medical care. The following are some brief extracts from stories told by various health care workers about the impact of rationing choices on their day-to-day work. The full stories are published elsewhere12.
The health visitor 'I will always try to give priority to children who have got the most severe need or where I know I can make a afford an overcoat to protect his consumptive chest, he has to make do with layers of brown paper. But he is diligent in treating his patients to the best of his ability in deeply unpromising circumstances.
The doctor's dilemma is put in a dialogue between Sir Colenso Ridgeon and another physician, Sir Patrick Cullen. 'Well Mr Saviour of lives', asks Cullen, 'which is it to be? That honest, decent man Blenkinsop or that rotten blackguard of an artist who is a genuine source of pleasant and good things?' As the play proceeds, the Aristotelian debate unfolds around whether this or that characteristic of each man would justify Ridgeon in choosing either Dubedat or Blenkinsop for the last available place on his life-saving regimen though there is a sharp sting in the tail that raises wholly other issues of ethical behaviour. MORALLY RELEVANT CRITERIA: AGE, BLAME AND MERIT Echoes of precisely the same debate can be heard reverberating around the places of contemporary ethical concern. Does this particular characteristic or that particular quality afford a morally acceptable justification for preferring this patient to that patient? There are several pertinent examples. One is age. All else being equal, would it be morally acceptable to choose younger patients in preference to older patients? On one side of the debate are those who favour the very English notion of the 'fair innings': all else being equal, younger people should have priority over older people simply because they have had less chance of achieving whatever it is they want to achieve in their lives7. On the other side are those who argue that it is wrong to lump disparate people together according to a single variable and then to treat them all in the same way8. It would be wrong to offer equal treatment to, say, all black people or all people in social class V just because they are black or in social class V; and it would be equally wrong to do so to, say, people over the age of 75 just because they are over 75.
Another contested characteristic is that of personal blame. All else being equal, would it be morally acceptable to choose patients who are blameless for their medical conditions in preference to those whose conditions are judged to have resulted from their freely chosen lifestyles? Smoking is an obvious example: if cardiac surgery has to be rationed, should patients whose conditions are caused by smoking be made to wait longer than those who have never smoked? Again, the debate divides. On one side is the overwhelming weight of contemporary medical ethical opinion that it is wrong to discriminate against patients simply because of their lifestyles. In the wake of the muchpublicized case of Harry Elphick, for example, the British Cardiac Society explicitly distanced itself from any clinical difference. I'll invest more time in them than in other families where I know I'm not going to make very much difference. That's the way I ration in my head, you know. If I've got to divide my time between two families, I'll give most of it to the family where I think I'll make the most progress rather than the family where I know I'm going to bang my head against a brick wall. But then I think, gracious, that's a dreadful thing to do. It may not be wrong, but it's definitely discrimination. That's the reality of it, it's discrimination.'
The consultant surgeon 'Rationing as I encounter it is unplanned. It's not purposeful. It happens simply because something that ought to be there isn't there. Sometimes it happens by accident, sometimes because no care plan has been put into place, sometimes because someone has failed to make a decision. That's the sort of rationing that I come up against. It's most definitely not rationing in the sense of deciding that we are not going to do such-and-such an operation on patients of such-and-such an age because the outlook for them is so poor or because they've brought it upon themselves.'
The district nurse 'Rationing runs like a thread through our care, but in the community it seems to be hidden rationing. We always have an underlying feeling that we're struggling to match resources to needs, and we are always having to bear costeffectiveness in the back of our minds when we're doing things. It's a general feeling that you're always trying to match resources which aren't as good as they should be to the needs of the population. A lot of it comes down to time: there always seem to be more things to do than you have time to do them. It's a very common thing running throughout our work. But it's not only time. It can also affect supplies and equipment.'
The consultant neurologist 'Beta interferon is one of the best paradigms for talking about the rationing of treatment. In this area there are about 570 patients with multiple sclerosis. It used to be untreatable, but really good evidence has emerged that under certain' circumstances significant alterations to the natural history of the disease can be made by giving beta interferon. But it comes at a cost. Ten thousand pounds per person per year, to be precise, and we have estimated that about 220 of the 570 MS patients in this area would be eligible for beta interferon on an open ended commitment.
The consequence of this would be a bill of about £2.2 million per year for the health authority-which they feel they cannot afford. So we had to decide upon a mechanism for rationing the drug.'
The nurse manager 'When staff are tired and stressed, they can't be expected to do complex calculations about drug doses and that sort of thing. And the patients we have nowadays are mostly very ill and dependent. These days, if you can get out of bed and put your slippers on, then you're discharged. So both the pace and the intensity of work on the ward is so much quicker, and there may well be times when safety could be called into question.'
The consultant psychiatrist 'Rationing affects me most in personnel matters. My colleagues all seem to be very busy all of the time, and I think the pressure has been exacerbated by a great many early retirements. But this has happened at the very time when the context and the details of health care have become more sophisticated. For example, the level of documentation that is now required is far higher than it was ten years ago. Care plans and supervision registers and various aspects of Mental Health Act administration are all very much more detailed and time-consuming than they once were. And they all involve an opportunity cost in terms of the time we can spend in face-to-face contact with our patients.'
The general practitioner 'General practitioners nowadays are pushing hard for outpatient appointments. It's no longer a question of writing one referral letter. You often write two, sometimes three, and a phone call, sometimes two or three phone calls to push hard at the door to get the patient seen. There is also the ethically worrying aspect to it that if you refer quite a number of patients privately, that consultant will probably see your referrals a little more quickly. That's a little underhand, but we all know it happens. I've got friends who are terribly conscientious about this sort of thing who say they couldn't behave like that. In a way I admire them for it, but I have to say that it always surprises me because it's disadvantaging their own patients.'
The consultant geriatrician 'Long-term problems are being stacked up for the sake of short-term budgetary savings. I often think that our efficiency might be greater overall if we were able to spend more time making very thorough and effective evaluations in the first place because I believe we would actually save more money in the long term. But we are driven by the over-riding need for the acute hospitals to reduce their costs. The managers are constantly trying to lot of the least advantaged. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the traditional view of health inequalities in the UK, which tends to see any inequality as intrinsically bad and in need of correction. A Rawlsian perspective would allow a different judgment to be reached: if, for example, the necessary price to be paid for improving the mortality experience of people at the bottom end of the socioeconomic gradient is a widening of the gap between them and those at the top of the scale, then so be it. It would be a just outcome. What matters, morally, would be the absolute gains in their mortality experience.
Others have tried to think in rather more concrete terms about the nature of a just structure of healthcare.
One such is Len Doyal15. At the heart of his ideal scheme of things is the notion that healthcare is morally important because illness and disability affect our capacity to flourish as human beings in a way that few other things can do. If our health is compromised by a lack of needed medical care, then our status as morally responsible actors is threatened and we cannot fulfil our potential as human beings. It follows from this that if healthcare rationing is inevitable, every main category of care should be rationed equally, for to do otherwise would be unfair to those who happened to be in need of the care that was being axed the most. It would not be fair to cut, say, 5% of the budget for mental illness services while leaving services for cardiac surgery untouched, for that would be an unjust discrimination against those whose particular needs were for psychiatric care and in favour of those in need of heart surgery. The same kind of argument applies equally to increases in services. As we read the ways in which Doyal elaborates this core idea, we can see how radically its application would change the structures of health care in the UK, for nothing like it has ever been built into the decision-making processes of the NHS.
ETHICS AND THE PROCESSES OF CARE
There are ethical issues surrounding the processes as well as the structures of health care. Even if we conclude that a just system of healthcare rationing is too elusive to be captured in the structures of the system, we should at least make sure that rationing works in a way that is (and is seen to be) tolerably fair at all the levels at which it operates. The questions may differ somewhat at the different levels. At the uppermost level, for example, Albert Weale has addressed the question of the proper role of an open and responsible government in the rationing process, and he has proposed some searching answers16.
Weale argues that a responsible government would first specify the total volume of resource that it was making available for healthcare over a specified period of time. Next, it would itemize as precisely as possible the package stop elderly patients from getting into their acute hospitals at all, and then to get them out again as quickly as possible. Yet this is precisely the environment in which the elderly need to be thoroughly assessed because it's in the acute hospital that the more complicated investigations are done, and it's there that you've got all the specialist advice you might want.'
The specialist in public health 'Our approach to the list of surgical restrictions was simply to ask ourselves what was acceptable not a systematic way at all. The restrictions include cosmetic surgery, the reversal of female sterilization and vasectomy, varicose veins unless they're very severe, and complementary therapies. In some cases we don't buy them at all; in others we buy them in restricted volume. As I said, the choices were made in a very pragmatic way ad hoc, almost. Well, that's a polite way of describing it. What really happened to take the example of cosmetic surgery was that I talked to the plastic surgeons and they said, why don't you just say that you're not going to allow anything except where we think it should be done. And that's how it was done.'
ETHICS AND THE STRUCTURES OF CARE
These stories reveal many facets to the experiences of rationing that are faced by those who are daily required to squeeze the quart of healthcare from the pint pot of resources. For convenience, the ethical issues which they raise can be arranged within Donabedian's trilogy of the structures, processes and outcomes of care13.
The key question about the structures of care is whether it is possible to build a bias towards justice into the anatomy and physiology of the healthcare system. It is self-evidently a complex question, and those who have tackled it have commonly done so at a high level of generality. One such is John Rawls14. His huge and intricate theory of justice, though not about healthcare as such, nevertheless contains insights that may cause us to reflect upon the ways in which healthcare is structured. For example, one of the three major principles lying at the core of his theory is the principle of difference though Rawls is careful to emphasize that it is the least of the three in terms of precedence and should never be allowed to compromise people's equal access to whatever is agreed to be an appropriate set of basic human liberties. The principle of difference proposes that, for moral purposes, what matters is not the existence or even the size of any inequality but rather the absolute position of those who find themselves at the bottom of the pile. Inequalities from this viewpoint are to be tolerated and even encouraged provided they function to improve the absolute of care that could be afforded from it. Then a responsible government would explain and justify its choice of what was included in, and omitted from, the package. Finally, it would invite the electorate to say whether it endorsed the government's proposed package or whether it preferred other trade-offs between taxes and services or between services and standards. What a responsible and open government would not do, Weale suggests, is pretend that more care could be provided from the volume of resource than was actually the case, nor would it try to reap political credit by relying on the goodwill or exploitation of staff to squeeze more care out of the tube of resources than is reasonably possible.
We can easily recognize the extent to which any real-life government falls short of such ideal behaviour, but we can also perceive the tangled web of ethical and professional issues that would be implied in its fulfilment. It would imply, for example, that the criteria which are used in rationing decisions should be explicitly articulated and openly known. They should not depend upon the implicit or covert judgments of doctors. Do we, however, wish to constrain clinical freedom in this way? It would imply too that public values as well as political and professional values should be reflected in the choices that are made; but what is government then to do if publicly articulated values conflict with professional views? What, for example, should happen if the public wish to see priority being given to the intensive care of extremely low birthweight babies over the routine health surveillance of pre-school children? Any progress down the road towards more open and responsible government, as Weale has defined it, would sooner or later require us to confront these matters.
ETHICS AND THE OUTCOMES OF CARE
Thirdly, there are ethical issues surrounding the outcomes of healthcare. An obvious example is the voguish (if rather clumsy) idea of 'maximizing healthcare'. It is now an explicit government policy to 'improve the health of the population as a whole [my emphasis] by increasing the length of people's lives and the number of years people spend free from illness'17. Although we might not find fault with this as a political slogan, it does not sit easily with the notion of justice. An absurdly reductionist illustration may suffice to make the point. Imagine a group of 10 patients who are suffering from a potentially fatal condition. Imagine further that the budget available for their treatment is £1000. Of the 10 patients, 2 are in an advanced stage of the disease. Their lives could be extended by five years; but since the cost of treating them would be £-500 each, the entire budget would be spent on them. The remaining 8 patients are in an earlier stage of the disease. Their lives could be extended by ten years, but since the cost of treating them would be £125 each, this too would consume the entire budget. What would be the 'best' way of using the budget, given a controlling policy of increasing the health of the population as a whole? The rational answer, in a context that seeks to maximize the health gain from a given resource, would be to treat the 8 patients with the more promising prognoses. That way, a further eighty years of life would be gained from the budget. Were the budget to be spent in any other way, fewer extra years of life would result; and were it all to be spent on the 2 patients with the worst outlook, only ten extra years of life would be gained. Yet what about the 2 patients whose more serious needs would simply be brushed aside in the quest to maximize the aggregate health of the group as a whole? Do not they also have a moral claim on the collective resources of the nation? Indeed, do they not have a particular moral claim in view of their more desperate plight? Would it not be an injustice to ignore their more pressing needs for the sake of a supposedly larger collective good?
Such questions could perhaps be brushed aside as academic musings were it not for the fact that this kind of approach is fundamental to the various cost-benefit approaches to rationing that are deployed in healthcare. The quality adjusted life year (QALY) is an obvious example. Within the limitations of the data it employs, the QALY purports to show the numbers of years of additional life, of a standard quality, that can be expected to result from different treatments. By relating these benefits to the costs of securing them, different treatments can be ranked in a league table of value for money. Such tables typically show that smoke-stop clinics and hypertension screening offer better value for money than treatments such as coronary artery bypass grafting and transplant surgery, which in turn are better value than neurosurgery for brain tumours or erythropoietin for patients on haemodialysis18.
The approach is unashamedly utilitarian.
Yet at the heart of QALYs and other such devices there lies a deep moral concern19. Since they are measuring people's capacity to benefit from care rather than their need for it, they have little to say about the justice of any particular way of distributing healthcare. Justice, we may feel, requires us to try to provide services in proportion to people's need for them. Utilitarianism, by contrast, requires services to be provided in proportion to people's ability to benefit from them. If Mrs G has end-stage renal disease and a donor kidney is not available, her need for haemodialysis is of the highest order, for without it she will die. If Mrs H, by contrast, has an arthritic hip, she may be in considerable pain and her movement may be severely restricted, but her need for treatment would scarcely be seen as matching that of Mrs G. Yet under every QALY calculation, hip replacements offer much better value for money than either home or hospital dialysis; and if the health authority in which both Mrs G and Mrs H reside has followed the utilitarian guidelines and invested more heavily in hip replacements than in dialysis facilities, then Mrs G's claims on the resources of the NHS (and the claims of all those of whom she is the exemplar) will be systematically devalued in comparison to those of the relatively less needy Mrs H (and all those of whom she is the exemplar).
A WAY FORWARD?
These, then, are some of the issues surrounding the rationing of healthcare that give rise to important ethical concerns.
There are, of course, no absolute answers to them no morally 'correct' ways of handling the gap between supply and demand in healthcare. Different ways of doing it invoke different principles of rationing, and principles are by their very nature pluralist and contested. It does seem important, however, to recognize the moral dimensions to rationing and not to pretend that deeply difficult and contentious choices can somehow be made in a technical and value-free way. This means, first, that we need to debate and clarify the points at which the rationing shoe is pinching the most in order to understand the moral dimensions of what we are doing; and having done that, we need to find ways of allowing the rationing processes to be open to, and reflective of, such understanding. Even that, however, may be an absurdly unrealistic counsel of perfection.
